66 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
22361 | Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
10073 | There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P] |
10616 | Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P] |
10074 | A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P] |
10612 | An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P] |
10605 | Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P] |
10075 | A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P] |
10076 | The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P] |
10615 | The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P] |
10595 | A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P] |
10602 | A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P] |
10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
10079 | A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P] |
10077 | A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P] |
10078 | An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P] |
10070 | If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P] |
10086 | Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P] |
10596 | A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P] |
10598 | A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P] |
10597 | 'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P] |
10069 | A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P] |
10609 | Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P] |
10087 | A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P] |
10088 | Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P] |
10080 | 'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P] |
10081 | A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P] |
10083 | A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P] |
10084 | A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P] |
10085 | The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P] |
10601 | The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P] |
10600 | Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P] |
10599 | For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P] |
10610 | The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P] |
10619 | The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P] |
10618 | All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P] |
10608 | The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P] |
10849 | Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P] |
10850 | Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P] |
10851 | Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P] |
10852 | Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P] |
10068 | Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P] |
10603 | The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P] |
10604 | Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P] |
10848 | Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P] |
10617 | The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
18278 | Kant showed that our perceptions are partly constructed from our concepts [Reichenbach] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
8410 | A theory of causal relations yields an asymmetry which defines the direction of time [Reichenbach, by Salmon] |
14935 | The direction of time is grounded in the direction of causation [Reichenbach, by Ladyman/Ross] |